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Abstract 
How does a major financial network innovation influence firm performance? Despite much 
speculation we have little hard quantitative evidence about the impact of technology diffusion 
in financial services. In this paper we use the entire adoption history for SWIFT (the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication - standards provider and messaging 
carrier) matched to bank-level panel data for the US, Canada and 27 European countries. Our 
dataset covers almost 7,000 banks (including 1,689 SWIFT adopters) between 1998 and 
2005. We find that adoption appears to have large effects on profitability, but it takes several 
years before any positive return is discernible, consistent with the idea of significant 
complementarities between new technologies and firm organization. The profitability effect 
operates by both raising sales and decreasing operating costs and is greater for smaller firms 
than larger firms. Although the long-run effects are similar, US and UK banks appear to reap 
the benefits from adoption more quickly than their Continental European counterparts. This is 
consistent with the idea that the impact of information and communication technologies is 
stronger in the US than Europe due to lower adjustment costs. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of information and communication technology (ICT) on performance has been hotly debated for 
many years. Initially there was doubt over whether ICT had a significant effect on productivity1, but over 
the last decade evidence has mounted confirming that ICT does have major effects on economic 
performance at both the macro and micro levels. A large number of studies now report a positive effect of 
ICT investment on a range of measures of economic performance2 (see the surveys in Brynjolfsson and 
Yang, 1996, or Draca, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2007), however, the magnitude of the ICT effect varies 
between firms, sectors and nations. In particular, US firms appear to be much better at reaping productivity 
benefits from ICT than their European counterparts (e.g. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2007) which may 
explain faster productivity growth in the US than Europe after 1995 (Stiroh, 2002).  
 
One of the sectors that has been transformed by significant improvements in ICT is financial services. The 
implications of ICT for the global financial system have been fundamental. ICT not only transformed 
transactions processes but also facilitated the creation of new financial products, changed the nature of 
work (Barrett and Walsham, 1999), helped globalize financial markets (Sassen, 2002) and restructured the 
character of financial intermediation (BIS, 2002). Financial institutions have long been among the most 
intensive users of information technologies but there is relatively little research probing the impact of ICT 
on performance in the financial sector. One line of research employs a case study approach (e.g. Clemons 
and Weber, 1990; Scott and Barrett, 2005) which is useful for understanding the richness of processes in 
specific contexts but is hard to generalise. For example, Autor et al (2002) examine the introduction of 
automatic image processing on one of the top 20 US banks, arguing that the introduction of complementary 
organizational changes were crucial in understanding the impact on performance. A second approach is to 
econometrically estimate the impact of ICT, but this has the disadvantage that the measures are necessarily 
crude, such as the total ICT expenditure3. For example, Casolaro and Gobbi (2007) estimate profit and cost 
functions for a panel of 600 Italian banks 1989-2000 and find that IT capital intensive techniques 
significantly increase total factor productivity. Jun (2008) reports the findings from several studies showing 
a positive relationship between IT and banking performance, and also presents results showing that IT 
investments are associated with higher returns on assets in a sample of 22 South Korean securities firms. 
Anderson et al (2006) investigate the value implications of investments on information technology on a 
panel of Fortune 1000 companies, including 62 banks, and find that firm value increased on average with 
Y2K spending on IT. Finally, Parsons et al (1993) estimate a cost function using data from a single large 
Canadian bank between 1974 and 1987 and find a weak but significant correlation between productivity 
growth and the use of computers. While these are all useful, treating ICT as a single analytic category 
makes it hard to disentangle which aspects of ICT led to performance increases and identify the dynamic 
effects of ICT adoption. 
 
Our paper is distinct from the previous literature in several respects. First, we propose an in-depth 
econometric case study of a particular ICT-related innovation in a particular sector (banking), rather than 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. 
1 This trend was appropriately characterized by Robert Solow’s famous quote that ‘you can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics’ (New York Times, 1987), which eventually became known as the 
Productivity Paradox. 
2 Examples would include Aral, Brynjolfsson and Wu (2006), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2004), Bresnahan et al (2002), 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2006), or Dewan and Kraemer (2000). 
3 See also Banker and Kauffman (1988), or Alpar and Kim (1991). 
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examining ICT in general. This follows in the tradition of Griliches (1957) who first launched an 
econometric study of diffusion by looking at the case study of hybrid corn in US agriculture. Second, we 
track the effects of the adoption of SWIFT in a large sample of banks (almost 7,000) in the US, Canada and 
27 European countries. Previous micro-econometric studies have (at best) limited themselves to a single 
country, even though many industries, such as financial services, are international in scope. Thirdly, we 
have been granted confidential access to the population of adopters and the exact timing of adoption by 
SWIFT. We are therefore able to track the long-run effects of adoption (up to 30 years) which is important 
as the impact of innovation is unlikely to be realised in the short run (as we show)4. Finally, as part of our 
examination into whether SWIFT adds value by influencing organisational as well as technological changes 
we analysed qualitative data prior, during, and after our econometric analysis. The complementary data was 
gathered in two stages: we began by interviewing more than 20 SWIFT employees, bank executives, and 
domain experts who described the SWIFT implementation process and the potential benefits. Secondly, we 
conducted a qualitative case study focusing on a small-medium bank within our sample to hypothesize and 
compare our findings to the quantitative results.  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal a large effect of the adoption of this financial innovation 
on firm performance (mainly measured by profitability, but also by costs, revenue and survival). This effect 
only occurs after a large number of years which suggests the need for complementary organizational 
changes to take place when adopting new technologies. The effect is also larger for US and UK banks than 
their continental European counterparts which may find it easier to adjust labor and organizational 
structures to reap these benefits. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two provides background information on SWIFT as well as the 
relevant technologies and standards, and outlines a brief cost-benefit analysis on the adoption of SWIFT 
alongside the findings of a case study. In sections Three and Four we describe our data and expose the 
empirical framework, and in section Five we present our main results. Conclusions are provided in section 
Six. 
 
2. Analytical Description of SWIFT 
Founded in Brussels in 1973, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(S.W.I.F.T.) is a co-operative organization serving as a shared global communications link and a common 
language for international financial transactions (SWIFT, 2006). The operation of its network started in 
1977 and it was initially supported by 518 Banks in 22 countries. Since then, the use and size of its 
platform has expanded rapidly and it has evolved from a mere tool for bankers into a broadly based 
institution serving the financial community. Today, SWIFT is headquartered in Brussels with data centres 
in Belgium and the United States. It has more than 8,400 live users connecting from 208 countries which 
may sound relatively small however each “user” is an organization which means that there may be 
thousands of employees within a single organisation using SWIFT at any one time. In the three decades of 
its operation, SWIFT has assumed a dominant presence the financial sector and has created an extensive 
infrastructure of interconnectivity between its members. Significant economies of scale have been created 
through the spread of its network. 
 
                                                 
4 Geroski, Machin and Van Reenen (1993), amongst others, show that there are long lags between innovation and 
improved firm performance. 
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Figure 1 shows the number of SWIFT adopters in total for some major countries over the entire history of 
SWIFT using the population database (see below). As shown below, SWIFT was adopted first mainly by 
European-based banks in 1978, although by the end of the period, US banks lead the curve, followed by 
UK banks. The overall diffusion curve does not seem to follow the traditional “S” shape, suggesting that 
SWIFT adoption is not a completed process, by any means. 
 
One distinctive characteristic of SWIFT is that from its inception it has assumed the status of a jointly 
owned non-profit making organisation where the member banks own share capital and split their operating 
costs according to their message volume and the number of terminals (Ambrosia, 1980). The community 
ethos that arose as a result of this governance structure has particular advantages including knowledge-
sharing above and beyond the more easily identifiable benefits of SWIFT membership. The key service 
offered by SWIFT is the ability for financial institutions listed in the SWIFT membership directory to send 
funds directly to each other at a greatly reduced cost relative to traditional methods of fund transfers (bank 
drafts, airmail transfers). By increasing speed and volume as well as improving security, the SWIFT 
platform introduced considerable efficiencies compared to the previous system of correspondent banking 
(Winder, 1985). 
 
Figure 1 – SWIFT Diffusion by selected countries 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows the diffusion curves for eight of the countries in our sample (USA, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Spain, France, and Switzerland). The lines represent the cumulative number of SWIFT adopters over time from 1977 to 
2006. The precise number of adopters for each country in 2006 can be found in Table 1. 
 
 
SWIFT’s growth was not smooth. Shortly after the network started its operation, it was realised that the 
general legal principles of international business practices were inadequate to deal with the new technology 
of SWIFT transactions. In the late 1970s, members adopted new SWIFT-specific rules which defined their 
liabilities and responsibilities in more explicit terms. However, additional problems emerged due to the 
large and exceptionally diverse membership of banks with different sizes and dissimilar expectations. 
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These issues were compounded by what was described at the time as a “complicated administrative and 
political structure” (Winder, 1985). 
 
In 1987, despite resistance to earlier proposals to expand SWIFT membership beyond banks (Banker, 
1992), a majority voted to increase the user-base by including other financial service providers: broker-
dealers, exchanges, central depositories and clearing institutions (Copon and Gold, 2001). Many 
corporations had also expressed interest in joining the network but their attempts to become members were 
rejected. In 2006, SWIFT announced the approval of a new corporate group of users – large non-financial 
institutions such as Microsoft, Volkswagen, Hewlett-Packard, etc. – that would be able to connect to 
SwiftNet via a member Bank. Practitioners have described the existence of this model, which is known as 
MA-CUG model, as “limited but relevant access” to SwiftNet and a lively debate about whether 
corporations should have direct access to the network or not continues. 
 
Since its launch in 1973, SWIFT has largely maintained its identity within the financial services industry as 
a “proprietary communications platform” that allows financial institutions to “connect and exchange 
financial information securely and reliably”5. Various attempts to create similar networks prior to the 
launch of SWIFT failed due to lack of collaboration between banks. The design and governance of 
SWIFT’s potential predecessors were regarded as captive by competitors and the suspicion of proprietary 
interest eventually led to their demise6. The establishment of SWIFT marked a concord which has held for 
over thirty years and dampened the development of alternatives. There are some business and connectivity 
“solutions” in the technology market that compete with SWIFT, however they account for a small fraction 
of business and do not offer such a wide portfolio of services or global coverage. 
 
2.1 Technology and Solutions 
SWIFT was initially founded with the objective of automating and potentially replacing the telex as a 
means of communication between banks7. Hence, the operations and business requirements of banks still 
remain its primary focus. SWIFT promotes and develops standardized global interactivity for financial 
transactions. It operates a focal service for the exchange of financial messages such as payments, 
confirmations, settlement messages, letters of credit, securities transactions, and other types of standardized 
messages. Member institutions generate and send individual structured financial messages that are then 
forwarded through the set infrastructure to the recipient member organization. SWIFT’s main role is to 
deliver these messages rapidly and securely with the “lowest risk and highest resilience” (SWIFT London 
2008). It functions as the core gateway“…as an obligatory passage point to other parts of the transactional 
infrastructure, which gives it effective control of the payment [or any other] system” (Weirdt, Hadji-Ashrafi, 
Randall, and Scott, 2005). SWIFT’s central store-and-forward messaging service is FIN8. FIN messaging 
services are provided via SwiftNet, a reliable and secure IP network (SIPN) that offers a single window to 
other member organizations. Today, SWIFT provides numerous solutions for an array of organisations such 
as banks, broker/dealers, corporations, custodians, investment managers, payment and securities market 
infrastructures. 
 
                                                 
5 Source: http://www.swift.com 
6 For a detailed historical study on the origins and development of SWIFT see also Scott and Zachariadis (2010). 
7 The telex was a system that used telephone-like rotary dialling to connect teletypes. Subscribers to a telex service 
could exchange textual communications and data directly with one another (Britannica Online Encyclopaedia). 
8 For more specific information on SWIFT solutions and products visit: http://www.swift.com/index.cfm? 
item_id=1008. 
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In addition to its network, SWIFT uses advanced technologies and its standards expertise to leverage its 
business. SWIFT provides a vast range of standards products, tools and services. It promotes 
interoperability via its standards programme. Apart from achieving technical interoperability, SWIFT 
standards and technologies provide a way for users to automate their transactions throughout their lifecycle. 
For example, SwiftNet FIN is a “Straight-Through-Processing” product that enables an entire transaction to 
be conducted electronically without the need for manual intervention. This is important because it 
minimizes operational costs, reduces systemic and operational risk, and improves the certainty of the 
transaction process. 
 
2.2 Infrastructure deployment and Connectivity 
SWIFT groups its clients into three different categories according to the volume of transactions they 
process per day. Low volume customers have a traffic volume of below 1,000 messages/files per day, 
middle-volume process between 1,000 and 40,000, and high-volume typically exchange more than 40,000 
messages/files per day. Each user, depending on the category he belongs, needs to go through a different 
implementation process in order to connect to SwiftNet and be able to use the interfaces that SWIFT 
provides for each of the groups. Within every traffic-volume cluster, the customers need to agree on the 
SwiftNet infrastructure they will deploy and choose between three basic connectivity options: a Private 
Infrastructure (direct connectivity), a Shared Connection (indirect connectivity), or a Shared Infrastructure 
(indirect connectivity). Every connectivity option has different implementation costs. For example, high-
volume users with private infrastructures will need to set up and align an entire arrangement of business 
applications, middleware, messaging software, communication hubs, and network links in contrast to low-
volume customers that can outsource all the required applications and use a shared connection to link to 
SwiftNet. In the case of a private infrastructure the costs can be substantially higher than other options of 
connectivity. Time is also a crucial element in the adoption process. Private infrastructures can take much 
longer to install and test than other smaller infrastructures. To complement its intensive connectivity 
options, SWIFT offers a ‘light’ solution for customers who plan to exchange less than 200 messages/files 
per day9.  
 
In addition to conducting interviews with SWIFT senior managers and SWIFT customers, we studied 
relevant documentation in order to identify the requirements for successfully establishing a SwiftNet 
connection (see Figure 2). No matter what connectivity option is chosen, every new customer needs to go 
through three distinct phases of implementation: the Pre-implementation, Implementation, and Post-
implementation phases. In the Pre-implementation phase the user needs to define its requirements and 
identify the project teams. After analysing its current infrastructure a proposal needs to be made on the 
network configuration that is implemented. When the two previous steps are approved, the client prepares 
its order by completing all the essential forms. SWIFT then validates the order and if required, requests 
corrections before moving onto the next phase. The Implementation stage consists of Provisioning and 
Installation of the full configuration. Hardware (e.g. lines, VPN boxes, routers etc.) and software (e.g. 
interface and communication packages etc.) are installed and the connection to SwiftNet is established and 
ready to test. The last Post-Implementation phase starts off by performing end-to-end tests at application 
and network level. A SwiftNet FIN session is established to check the system’s resilience by sending and 
receiving traffic. When the testing period is over the customer confirms all systems are operational and live 
activation takes place (the SWIFT “Go Live” point). A brief snapshot of the SWIFT implementation 
process timeline is given in Figure 2.1. 
                                                 
9 Alliance Lite is an Internet-based service that provides a low cost and secure access to the SWIFT network. 
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The total process from the beginning of the Implementation phase (which starts after the validation of the 
SWIFT order) until the Go-Live stage, lasts on average seven months. The key functions that can postpone 
the live activation of the system for more than a year from the initiation of the Implementation stage are: 
the Middleware Application and the Testing phase. The Middleware application is optional (according to 
the type of connectivity the user will select), but its development and deployment are very crucial 
especially for large firms that need to connect multiple business (back-office) applications with SWIFT. 
For example, investment banks and other securities institutions might want to link up all their back-office 
applications with SWIFT in order to send/receive confirmations of trades, settle their payments with third 
parties, and communicate with market infrastructures (such as CREST). All these requirements need to be 
configured in the Middleware Application in order to ensure that all their needs are encountered. 
Consequently, the testing phase is also demanding because it must ensure that all possible transactions are 
error free when the system goes live. Middleware applications are also core components enabling Straight-
Through-Processing (STP)10; they integrate the customer’s business applications with the SWIFT gateway 
and translate financial transactions into SWIFT messages that are then sent to their counterparties through 
the secure network without human intervention. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – SWIFT Implementation timeline 
 
Note: Figure 2.1 presents an estimate based upon discussions with SWIFT managers and customers as well as an analysis of 
relevant documentation. Adoption of SWIFT can be categorized into three distinct phases: the Pre-implementation, the 
Implementation, and the Post-implementation phase. 
 
 
2.3 Costs and Benefits of adoption 
The associated costs and benefits for deployment within a population of this size and range can vary 
significantly between institutions. Our first task in this paper is to disentangle the various costs and benefits 
from SWIFT adoption and categorise them according to their timing and significance during the 
implementation process. 
 
SWIFT Costs 
                                                 
10 Straight-Through-Processing (STP) enables entire transactions to be processed electronically without re-keying or 
manual intervention. 
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Once SWIFT is up and running in the post-implementation phase the overt variable costs are the 
maintenance, upgrade, and improvement expenses. Two additional operating expenses are the fees SWIFT 
charges its customers (per transaction and fixed annual fees), and any future potential training. These again 
vary according to the Connectivity package the client operates.  There may also be further significant costs 
that can overrun into the post-implementation period. So while the major sunk costs relate to the original 
analysis and design process, testing and subsequent software development can be extensive. There is an 
additional opportunity cost associated with the level of time spent managing change and disruption costs 
associated with the implementation. These can go on well after the “Go-Live” period as teething problems 
and re-organizations continue to occur as the system beds down. 
 
Off-the-shelf products such as hardware and essential software can also be regarded as one-off expenses. 
By contrast, users that decide to implement a private, in-house built infrastructure are likely to have 
relatively higher capital costs than users with a shared connection or infrastructure. Banks that do not 
possess the expertise to install the required configuration have the option to outsource the implementation 
project to a SWIFT “Service Partner”. There are initial training costs to ensure the minimum essential 
knowledge. Finally, there is SWIFT’s one-time connection fee that also differs according to the 
connectivity option the client chooses. 
 
SWIFT Benefits 
In contrast to expenses, benefits are typically not realized until the infrastructure is properly configured and 
used. We have already mentioned some of the benefits that SWIFT offers to its customers but will 
distinguish between them further in terms of intangible and tangible benefits. Intangible benefits (also 
known as “soft benefits”) are related to the reduction of operational risk and fraud, enhancement of 
customer satisfaction, security and resilience, easier regulatory compliance, greater visibility, control, 
reliability and timing. These are difficult to measure, but will be captured in our study because over the 
longer-run they will be reflected in profitability. Further, we gathered qualitative evidence from domain 
experts about how these contribute to the bottom line performance of the firm. 
 
The most obvious tangible benefit is the reduction of operating costs. While the implementation of SWIFT 
can be a costly investment it is regarded as having a long-term cost-saving effect. SWIFT helps reduce 
user’s costs by providing reach, re-usability and standardisation. These three characteristics substitute for a 
number of business activities that are obligatory for a transaction to take place. Legal, labor and other 
communication costs can be radically reduced with the use of a technology that can standardise these 
actions and consolidate them into a single operating platform.  
 
Another desirable property that derives from the design and the technical attributes of SWIFT is scalability. 
It is critical for an organization to have the capability to support the increasing demand in products and 
services. This is of particular importance in the financial services sector given the intense competition and 
fast-paced market developments. If a firm lacks the ability to create economies of scale that will counter the 
increasing volume of transactions it can constrain business growth. SWIFT allows banks and other 
institutions to communicate independent of their size, location, and volume of transactions. Therefore, 
adopters can deal with additional clients and handle the growing number of transactions. This offers a 
distinct advantage as a one-time investment can reduce the marginal operating costs for an extensive period 
of time as sales increase.  
 
Note that we would also expect the benefits of SWIFT to be increasing with the size of the network 
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(Economides, 1996; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). We expect to detect some supplementary boost in the 
performance of adopters, as SWIFT increases its popularity and the number of its members grows. Finally, 
SWIFT supports the creation of new revenue streams; as adopters expand their business network to new 
territories (not only geographically but also in terms of products) they can explore opportunities to increase 
their revenues. As the financial markets become global, there is an increasing need for cross-border 
payment products and services. SWIFT enables the globalization of the supply chain and expands reach to 
countries around the world. Greater access along with the automation and reliability of trusted 
communications help users secure new business and boost their revenues.  
 
2.4 Case Study 
In order to map the value generating mechanism associated with the adoption of SWIFT in detail, we 
conducted a qualitative case study at a small, UK-incorporated, commercial bank within our sample. The 
financial institution studied was established in 1984, and it currently operates five branches in the UK and 
two additional ones in foreign countries at Europe and South Asia. The average number of employees 
between 1998 and 2005 was 65, and the mean total assets were approximately $272 million11. The 
organisation adopted SWIFT in 2002. According to the General Manager at the head-office in London who 
is responsible for the implementation of the project, the idea to adopt SWIFT had been debated since 1997. 
While it was realized that adopting SWIFT would improve client services, the concern was that it would 
also drive up operating costs and therefore a decision could not be financially justified. A clear, identifiable 
return-on-investment (ROI) was prerequisite to approve a business case which ostensibly rested on cost-
saving rather than revenue generation. 
 
The decision to adopt the network innovation came after consultation with the marketing and sales teams 
who argued that SWIFT would increase business revenues and attract new clients. According to our 
interviewee, the bank eventually managed to crystallise a number of relationships with clients once SWIFT 
was installed and it also meant that they could "reach out" to several new potential clients with the added 
confidence of new services. In practice, benefits from the adoption of SWIFT could be categorised in three 
groups: firstly, even though no exact estimations could be made, it was expected that there would be an 
increase in revenues due to the increasing volume of transactions from existing and new clients. The old 
systems could not process the number of transactions that SWIFT could perform, thus making the new 
technology more efficient.  This is in line with the economies of scale that we discussed in our previous 
cost-benefit analysis. Secondly, the telex system was becoming obsolete and the service had many 
disruptions that cost the bank dearly both in terms of business transactions and trustworthiness. SWIFT 
adoption helped the bank to offer a better quality of service to its clients through its fast and reliable 
network. According to our interviewee, this was a significant advantage for the bank. Thirdly, SWIFT was 
directly connected to the bank’s in-house business applications which reduced the amount of manual work 
that the proprietary systems and telex connections required. Figure 2.2 outlines in more detail the 
contributions of SWIFT and the value added generated from its implementation and use. 
 
According to our interviewee, the costs went up as expected after the initial investment in SWIFT but in the 
long-term operating costs decreased as they were automating paper transactions and migrating manual 
work onto SWIFT. In addition, they took advantage of the system’s flexibility and linked their business 
                                                 
11 We chose to conduct our case study with a small bank as the impact of SWIFT adoption would be more prevalent 
and easier to identify. In addition, smaller firms in our sample seem to benefit more from SWIFT adoption rather than 
larger organisations as it is described in our results section. 
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applications to SWIFT software which allowed for more automation and a reduction in working hours on 
manual tasks12. The whole SWIFT implementation lasted around 6 months but was extended to two years 
with all the enhancements and relevant applications that were built during the post-implementation phase. 
Additional gains were realised later at an enterprise level when the system eventually functioned as a 
whole. Different banks may use SWIFT in a different way and take advantage of a broader set of 
alternative functions. In the following sections, we try to estimate the average effect of SWIFT on the 
population of its adopters in North America and Europe. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Detailed outline and value added from SWIFT adoption 
 
Note: Figure 2.2 presents a detailed illustration of the SWIFT function and clearly depicts the value added from its usage compared 
to the old system of communication between banks (Telex, FAX, and Proprietary systems). This figure was constructed after 
discussions with domain experts and studying relevant documentation. 
 
 
3. Data 
Our main dataset is a collection of detailed raw data on SWIFT adoption of 35,249 firms worldwide from 
1977 to 2006. This dataset is the complete global list of live SWIFT customers, operating 424 services and 
products in 208 countries. Following interviews with domain experts and technical staff from SWIFT, we 
decided to narrow the focus of our study about SWIFT technology adoption to “SwiftNet FIN” (or 
“SNFIN”), the most popular service and core SWIFT product. Considering the complexity of the financial 
systems around the world and the constraints that are placed from national financial regulatory bodies, we 
also limited our initial analysis in Europe and North America. Since 1977, SNFIN has been adopted by 
3,380 firms in the 29 countries of our sample. 
 
To this panel we matched information from Bankscope, a global database containing information on more 
than 28,000 public and private banks around the world. This is compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BVD), a 
European electronic publisher of business information. The database combines data from seven sources 
including Fitch Ratings, Capital Intelligence, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s etc. It includes all the information in the banks’ published accounts and is reasonably 
comprehensive in coverage for all but a number of smaller banks. The product of this merge is a unique 
dataset containing a large sample of firm-level longitudinal information on ICT adoption and financial 
                                                 
12 Even though no employees were laid off due to the adoption of SWIFT, working hours were allocated to different 
functions in the bank. 
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performance. Our financial data run from 1997 (the first year that Bankscope was produced) through 2006, 
but due to the small number of observations in years 1997 and 2006, we exclude them from our estimations 
and exploit the years from 1998 to 2005. After cleaning13 we are left with an unbalanced panel of 6,848 
firms and up to eight years of financial data.  
 
Our main indicator of diffusion is simply an adoption dummy equal to unity in the year that the bank adopts 
SwiftNet Fin marked by the end of the post-implementation and the start of the “Live” phase (recall figure 
2). It is unclear when the pre-implementation phase begins so we are careful to test for the exact timing (see 
below). In particular, it is likely that the benefits of SWIFT will not be observed in the first year, but 
instead there will be a longer term dynamic at work between the introduction of SWIFT and its eventual 
effect on the bottom line. The fact that we have the entire history of all adoptions of SWIFT is helpful here 
because we are able to construct long lags back to 1977 for each firm. In other words we are able (in 1998) 
to include up to a twenty year distributed lag for SWIFT adoption to examine the dynamic effects on firm 
performance. 
 
 
 
In Table 1, we present some statistics of our data by country. From BVD’s Bankscope we have 6,848 firms 
in our sampled countries as shows in column (1). Looking down the column, almost a quarter of firms are 
in Germany and almost one fifth in the US. Other countries which have many banks in the sample are the 
UK (6.6%), France (6.8%), Switzerland (7.9%) and Italy (11.4%). This reflects the size of the country, the 
relative importance of finance and the degree of fragmentation in the banking sector. Column (3) contains 
the population of 3,380 SWIFT adopters in our 29 countries from SWIFT's records. Our coverage rate of 
41% of all SWIFT adopters (in 2006) rather than 100% is mainly because of two reasons. First, we exclude 
all organisations outside of Europe and North America (e.g. Japan). Second, many SWIFT adopters are 
organisations such as stock exchanges, large corporations and other non-financial institutions that are not in 
Bankscope. Thus the matched data from the SWIFT-Bankscope merge in column (5) is only a sub-sample 
of the data in column (3)14. The final column shows the proportion of SWIFT adopters in the Bankscope 
data of column (1).  On average 25% of Bankscope's firms use SWIFT, but this ranges from 9.35% 
(Sweden) to 100% (Latvia and Lithuania). The econometric analysis includes all the firms in column (1), 
both adopters and non-adopters. 
 
In order to avoid any duplication in our data we excluded the unconsolidated accounts if we had their 
consolidated companions and used unconsolidated accounts of a subsidiary when there were no 
consolidated companions (results were robust when using only consolidated or only unconsolidated 
accounts).  
 
Measuring productivity is extremely challenging in the financial sector, mainly due the difficulties involved 
in developing an adequate price index for value added. In this paper we focus on the profit margin defined 
as gross pre-tax operating profits divided by revenue (“return on sales”) as our key performance measure 
(we also compare the results to alternative normalizations such as assets or equity). Accounting profits can 
                                                 
13 We clean our dataset from extreme negative and positive values that appear in our factor inputs. We also avoid 
dropping the data by winsorising our performance variables on the top and bottom percentiles. Results are similar if 
we simply trim the outliers. 
14 Bankscope also excludes some of the very smallest banks, which is another reason for the fall in numbers, but this 
is very minor. 
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diverge from economic profits, but the two are likely to be correlated at the firm level and there is a 
tradition in industrial organisation scholarship which supports using profitability as a key measure of firm 
performance15. 
 
A drawback of the data is that the SWIFT organization only keeps track of banks that currently use SWIFT. 
Thus our data is conditioned on firms who were alive in 2006 (whether or not they used SWIFT). 
Bankscope has data on firms who were dissolved prior to 2006, but because we were unsure of their 
SWIFT adoption history we dropped them from the baseline estimating sample.  In the robustness section 
we show that our findings are robust to any suspected survivor bias by examining the dissolved firms and 
survivor equations.  
 
Table 2 presents some of the descriptive statistics. The median bank in the sample is not large: it has 164 
employees, sales of $50 million and $5.9m in profit. The profit margin is 13.8%. Note, however, that the 
data is quite skewed as mean sales are $638m with a standard deviation of $3,702m. The other parts of the 
table break down the descriptive statistics by firm size and country. Anglo-American banks are larger and 
more profitable than other banks. 
 
Profits are the difference of revenues and costs, so we also present econometric results that disaggregates 
profitability into the revenue and cost components. We examine the change in employment following 
SWIFT adoption as a further outcome. 
 
We do not have data on the intensity of usage of SWIFT for the whole period (some proxies exist in one or 
two years but these are not consistent across countries. Consequently we focus on the simple adoption 
dummy as is standard in the diffusion literature. 
 
4. Modelling Strategy 
The main equation of interest is: 
 
1
0
      
L
j it j it i t it
jit
SWIFT X T
S
   

                                                               (1)  
 
Where (Π/S)it is the profit margin, the ratio of pre-tax profits to sales of firm i at time t. Xit denotes a vector 
of control variables such as the log of total assets to employees as proxy for the fact that firms of different 
capital intensity have different profit sales margins (e.g. if there are high fixed costs gross margins will be 
higher). The time dummies to control for macro-economic shocks, Tt. The ηi are a full set of firm fixed 
effects, to control for permanent unobserved heterogeneity (the country dummies are absorbed into this) 
and εit is an idiosyncratic error term. We discuss the properties of ηi and εit below. SWIFTit is an adoption 
variable that is a binary dummy variable taking the value of one in the year of the “go-live” phase of 
adoption and all years after (and zero in the years before the go-live year). We example several lag lengths, 
but our basic results allow a distributed lag up to L years on SWIFT where we estimate that L is 
approximately 9, in other words it takes about a decade for the full effect of SWIFT to play out on bank 
performance. This was also generally confirmed by the people we interviewed in banks. 
 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of the pros and cons see inter alia Slade (2004). 
Scott, Van Reenen, and Zachariadis 13
 
 
An econometric problem that arises while trying to estimate the effects of technology adoption on firm 
performance, is unobserved heterogeneity. This occurs when there are many factors correlated with firm 
performance that we do not measure. In our case, this may create an upwards bias for the coefficient of 
SWIFT if better managed firms are both more profitable and more likely to adopt SWIFT. We assume 
that these unobserved factors stay roughly constant over time and we treat them as fixed effects. Then we 
proceed with our estimation by including a full set of firm-level dummy variables (the within-groups 
estimator). A problem with the fixed effects estimator is that it will exacerbate classical measurement 
error causing the SWIFT coefficient to be attenuated towards zero. But since this is data from SWIFT's 
electronic customer database there is probably little measurement error. A second concern, however, is 
that there may still be unobserved shocks, so that SWIFT adoption is correlated with the error term, εit .In 
the absence of an instrumental variable it is difficult to do much abut this, but the fact that the main 
effects come not from the current variables but the long-lagged variables gives some reassurance that the 
positive effects we identify are not due to endogeneity bias. 
 
Finally, note that all standard errors are clustered by firm to allow for arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation 
over time (serial correlation is typical in firm panels even after removing fixed effects). 
 
5. Results and Interpretation 
5.1 Basic Results  
Table 3 reports our basic regression results using the specification in equation (1). Column (1) simply 
regresses profitability on a nine-year distributed lag of SWIFT adoption (all columns include year and firm 
dummies). SWIFT appears to have a significant impact on firm profitability for up to 9 years. Lags at ten 
years and beyond were insignificant. As shown at the base of the column the sum of the SWIFT 
coefficients are significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.0018) and the coefficients are jointly 
significant (p-value = 0.0006). The dynamics are interesting: there is little effect, even a negative 
coefficient in some of the early years of SWIFT on profits. The larger effects do not materialise for several 
years. We illustrate these dynamic effects in Figure 3 which presents the cumulative effect of SWIFT over 
time. The figure illustrates that positive returns are not clearly visible until two years after SWIFT adoption 
and only gradually build up the long-run effect of 0.0823, which is sizeable. This finding of very long lags 
before adoption and firm performance has often been suggested by case studies, but there are few 
econometric studies with a long enough time dimension to show this convincingly. Interestingly, Geroski, 
1991, also found that a lag length of about a decade was necessary to trace out the effects of innovation on 
productivity. 
 
 
 
Column (2) includes the capital assets to labor ratio as an additional control, whose coefficient is positive 
and highly significant. The dynamics are illustrated in Figure 4 and show an even slower build up of profit 
margins than the previous column – the long-run effect falls to 0.0716. Column (3) and Figure 5 includes a 
lead in SWIFT to pick up whether there were costs in the year prior to the “go-live” year of SWIFT. The 
coefficient is insignificant and actually positive rather than negative. This suggests either that the costs 
                                                 
16 It is not obvious that we want to condition on the capital-intensity measure as part of the effect of adoption is 
through changing the input requirements. We use this as our baseline, however, to be conservative. Including the 
lagged assets to labor ratio reduces the long-run coefficient to 0.047, but this is because we are reducing the sample 
size (we obtain a similar long-run effect on this smaller sample using the specification of column (2) Table 3. 
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before the go-live point are insubstantial or that most of these are captured in the year when the go live 
period occurs (given that the implementation period may just be months). 
 
The first three columns of Table 3 all suggest a positive long-run impact of SWIFT on profit margins of 
between 0.06 and 0.08 a decade after the adoption of SWIFT - a large effect17. 
 
5.2 Firm size  
In columns (4) and (5) we repeat the analysis by splitting the sample into larger and smaller firms based on 
median assets18. The specifications are identical to column (2) and the dynamic responses are plotted in 
Figures 6 and 7. The coefficients are much larger for smaller firms than bigger ones: smaller firms have a 
long-run SWIFT effect of 0.12 whereas this is only 0.02 for larger firms. Since the margins are larger for 
bigger firms (see Table 1) the implied proportionate effect is even greater for the small firms than the large 
firms. A possible explanation for this is that the larger firms have to bear a lot more re-organisation costs 
because of their legacy proprietary systems and greater difficulty in managing organizational upheavals.  
 
 
 
In summary, and taking all columns together, we have three key results. First, there seems to be a positive 
and statistically significant effect of SWIFT adoption on firm performance (measured in terms of the profit 
to sales ratio), and this effect appears to be substantial in magnitude. Second, this effect takes many years to 
play out  - around a decade. This is consistent with other recent findings on ICT and firm performance. 
Thirdly, this effect is much higher on smaller firms rather than big firms.  
 
5.3 Other Outcomes: Sales, Expenses and Labor 
Table 4 presents the estimates of three other outcome variables: ln(Sales), ln(costs) and ln(labor-capital 
ratio). As in the previous tables, in all columns, we control for firm fixed effects and we include a full set of 
country and year dummies. The dynamic responses are graphically presented in Figures 8-10) 
 
 
 
Column (1) of Table 4 presents the sales equation. Sales are positively and significantly associated with 
SWIFT adoption: the long-run effect of SWIFT on Sales is 40 log points, implying the firm sales increase 
about 50% (exp(0.4) - 1) over the decade since SWIFT was adopted. These results are consistent with our 
hypothesis that SWIFT creates new revenue streams and with our case study findings in which SWIFT 
resulted an increase in sales. 
 
The second column uses costs - operating expenses – as a dependent variable. Controlling for assets, we 
find that the first two years expenses actually increase and start to decrease only from the third year after 
adoption. The long-run effect is negatively correlated with SWIFT adoption and is statistically significant. 
The initial increase the long-term decrease of the costs is consistent with our story of how SWIFT affects 
firm operating expenses. While SWIFT in various cases demands a considerable initial amount of 
investment to implement and use, it substitutes different inputs that account for a large piece of the 
                                                 
17 The results are robust even when we put in country dummy and year dummy interactions (year*country) for all 
years and countries (long-run effect of SWIFT is 0.055 with a p-value of 0.016). 
18 Descriptive statistics on small and large firms are reported in Table 2. The results largely stay the same if we split 
our sample based on the number of employees instead of using total assets as a size indicator. 
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operating costs. From the results we can presume that operating costs fall by approximately 20% in the 10-
year period following SWIFT adoption. This is smaller than the proportionate increase in revenues, 
suggesting that SWIFT increases profits both by reducing costs and increasing demand, but the effect is 
stronger on revenues. 
 
In column (3) we use the ratio of employees over assets as a dependent variable. There appears to be a 
substantial shakeout of workers relative to capital following SWIFT adoption, presumably because SWIFT 
enables reductions in manpower. The results here are also statistically significant.  
 
5.4 Cross Country Differences: US/ UK versus Rest of Europe 
We examined differences in response parameters by country block and found that a key difference 
appeared to be between two sub-samples: “Anglo-American” countries (US and UK) and “Continental 
Europe”19. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the SWIFT coefficients on profits margins from the two 
samples, controlling again for assets and employees, firm fixed effects, year dummies and country 
dummies. Contrary to what one might think, the long-term effect of SWIFT is quite similar in the two sub-
samples. If anything Continental European firms have a slightly higher return (0.08) than the Anglo-
American firms (0.06). Considering the difference in the size of the firms in the two samples we construct 
two further sub-samples and compare US and UK with EU firms in the same size category. The results are 
reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. Here, we can see more clearly that the returns from SWIFT, 
investigating the same size category of firms, are very much alike in (0.12 in both sub-samples). Due to the 
large number of observations, the statistical significance of the European estimates is higher compared to 
the US and UK estimates. 
 
 
Overall we could not find any suggestive evidence that US/UK firms enjoy superior returns from SWIFT 
adoption in comparison to European firms in the long-run. However, by observing the dynamics of the 
effect of SWIFT over time (Figures 11-14), we observe something quite interesting. US/UK firms respond 
faster to change and harvest the benefits of ICT investment earlier than European firms. For example, in 
Figure 11, US and UK firms reach the long-term return 4 years after SWIFT adoption, while in Figure 12 
EU firms accomplish only 30% of their long-run returns in the same period. The results look similar in 
Figures 13 and 14. One explanation for this difference in the dynamics of SWIFT adoption and firm 
performance is that flexibility of labor and other regulations in the UK and US allow for a more rapid 
reorganisation to better leverage SWIFT. 
 
5.5 SWIFT Network Effects 
In Table 6, we augment equation (1) to include a network variable defined as the cumulated aggregate 
number of SWIFT adopters in a country in a year from the entire SWIFT population. 
 
 
 
Column (1) and (2) report the coefficients for network effects and lagged network effects respectively. In 
both columns we find a significant and positively correlated result on firm performance. Even though the 
coefficients seem small they suggest a considerable effect if the number of the adopters increases rapidly 
                                                 
19 It is unclear where Canada sits in this division as it has a much smaller financial sector that the US or UK. 
Consequently we drop it from this split. 
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every year in each country. The literal interpretation of the current results is that for every additional firm 
that adopts SWIFT in a specific country, other adopters will increase their average profit margin ratio by 
approximately 0.0002. If the number of adopters for example grows by 10 in a country in a year, firms are 
going to benefit from another 0.002 increase on their profit margin (1.3%).  
 
The full network effects are hard to credibly estimate as many are international rather than national. 
Unfortunately the aggregate number of adopters is collinear with the time dummies so cannot be separately 
identified. Still, the finding of intra-country network effects is consistent with what we would expect from a 
network technology like SWIFT. 
 
5.6 Are we over-estimating the SWIFT effect because of survivor bias?   
 
As noted in the data section we dropped the Bankscope firms who dissolved prior to 2006 because we were 
unsure of their adoption history (SWIFT does not keep track of users who have died).  Could this generate 
an upward bias to the results because SWIFT adopters may be more likely to exit due to possible 
organizational disruption?  
 
It is very likely that banks that dissolved prior to 2006 were non-adopters of SWIFT because a Bank 
Identifier Code (BIC) code is a necessary condition for SWIFT adoption and, according to Bankscope, only 
five of the 2,516 banks which exited over the 1997-2006 period had BIC codes. If we assume that the 
dissolved banks without a BIC code did not adopt SWIFT and the other five did adopt SWIFT our results 
are very robust20. Re-running the specification of Table 3 column 2 on the 7,208 firms (of living and dead 
firms) generated a long-run effect of SWIFT on profit margins of 0.071 (p-value = 0.0029) compared to 
0.070 in the baseline.  Replacing the dependent variable with survival (instead of profitability) led to an 
implied long-run positive effect of SWIFT of 5 percentage points (significant at the 1% level). This is 
consistent with the idea that SWIFT raises firm performance and suggests that our baseline results may 
actually be underestimating the effect of this financial innovation. 
 
 
5.7 Robustness Tests 
 
We examined a wide range of further tests to make sure that the results were robust. First, we included a 
specification with a full set of year dummies interacted with country dummies in column (1) of Table A1. 
The results are very similar to the baseline specification of column (2) Table 3, suggesting the linear time 
dummies are adequate. We re-estimated the basic model including total assets as a size measure. The 
second column shows similar effects to using whether asset per worker as in the baseline results. Third, we 
examined whether the results are driven simply by the difference between adopters and those who never 
adopted SWIFT. We are concerned that the latter are not a valid comparison group. Consequently columns 
(3) and (4) of Table A1 drop the firms who never adopted SWIFT. It is reassuring that the results are stable: 
the long-run effect is significant and positive (0.060). 
 
Fourth, we examined heterogeneity by type of bank. Table A2 shows that we have a range of banking types 
in the data with commercial banks being the most prevalent (28% of the sample). Table A3 estimates the 
                                                 
20 Note that how we deal with these five banks is immaterial. Dropping them from the sample or assuming they were 
non-adopters leads to near identical results. 
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models of Table A1 on the commercial banking sample alone. Reassuringly, the results are robust, with a 
significant long-run effect of 0.09 in column (9). By contrast, there is no significant effect on the non-
commercial banks (the long-run effect is actually negative).  Further investigation reveals that the SWIFT 
effects are weak or negative for some of the financial institutions including (see Table A2) - Central Banks, 
Islamic Banks, Credit banks, multi-lateral government banks, non-banking credit institutions, mortgage 
banks, savings banks and government credit institutions. Dropping these from the sample (as we do in the 
last two columns of Table A3), shows that we have a positive and significant long-run effect with the same 
properties as the basic model. This is unsurprising as the measurement of firm performance is particularly 
difficult in some of these organizations. It may also be related to the fact that many of these organizations 
are in the public sector where the ability to manage IT is notoriously poor. 
 
Finally, we also examined normalizing profits on assets or equity instead of sales, which led to similarly 
positive results21. Finally, we examined whether there was a premium to being an "earlier adopter". We 
could find no evidence of this. For example, if we split the sample into two periods (after 2001 and before 
2001, the long-run effect of SWIFT was 0.122 in the early period and 0.137 in the later period with both 
effects remaining significant. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the impact of ICT on the performance of firms in the financial services sector 
through looking at data on the adoption of a particular financial innovation - SWIFT, one of the first and 
probably the most ubiquitous network technology in the banking world. We exploit a unique and 
uncommonly rich data of a panel of banks in 29 countries in Europe and North America that allows us to 
control for a number of confounding influences. In addition, the breadth of our data enables us to construct 
long lags and investigate the dynamics of the effect of SWIFT on bank performance. 
 
Overall, we recover robust evidence that SWIFT adoption has a positive and significant correlation with 
firm performance even after controlling for many factors, including firm fixed effects. Our main results 
show that the returns from SWIFT can take up to ten years to be fully realised. As expected for most 
technology investments, we observe an extremely weak or negative result within the first few years of the 
adoption of SWIFT. This is consistent with previous findings that demonstrate that technological and 
organisational changes take time to implement and realise the benefits (e.g. Bresnahan et al, 2002). 
Additionally, the profitability effects of SWIFT derive mainly from an increase in sales, not just a fall in 
long-term operating expenses (due to fewer employees per unit of capital). Two additional results that 
emerge from our analysis are that smaller firms seem to benefit from relatively higher returns than the 
larger ones, and that US and UK firms reach long-run results earlier than the European firms. Finally, there 
is also some indication of the existence of network effects between the members of SWIFT within the same 
country. 
 
There are many outstanding issues and research questions. First, the long lags of the effects of SWIFT 
adoption on performance make it unlikely that our results are driven by endogeneity. Nevertheless, it would 
be desirable to have a better model of why some firms adopted SWIFT earlier than others. Second, 
understanding why smaller firms benefit more than larger firms from SWIFT adoption is important. For 
                                                 
21 For example, if we replace the dependent variable by the return on assets in column (1) of Table 3 the long-run 
effect is 0.226 over the mean of 0.775. 
18 Scott, Van Reenen, and Zachariadis
 
 
example, is this because, they find it easier to change internal organization? Finally, the crisis in the 
banking sector which occurred just after our sample period ends offers an opportunity to examine how 
early and later adopters responded differentially to the challenge of the crisis.  
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TABLE 1 – COUNTRY STATISTICS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country name Sample firms Percent 
Number of 
SWIFT 
adopters 
Percentage 
of SWIFT 
population 
Matched 
adopters in 
sample 
Proportion 
(%) of 
adopters in 
sample 
Austria 230 3.36 100 1.22 69 30.00 
Belgium 98 1.43 88 1.08 43 43.39 
Canada 83 1.21 62 0.76 31 37.35 
Cyprus 29 0.42 38 0.46 15 51.72 
Czech Republic 32 0.47 28 0.34 16 50.00 
Denmark 121 1.77 59 0.72 41 33.88 
Estonia 10 0.15 13 0.16 7 70.00 
Finland 19 0.28 22 0.27 7 36.84 
France 468 6.83 250 3.06 118 25.21 
Germany 1710 24.97 298 3.65 178 10.40 
Greece 23 0.34 41 0.50 19 82.60 
Hungary 40 0.58 43 0.53 25 62.50 
Ireland 70 1.02 81 0.99 37 52.85 
Italy 782 11.42 258 3.16 167 21.35 
Latvia 23 0.34 27 0.33 23 100.00 
Lithuania 10 0.15 12 0.15 10 100.00 
Luxembourg 115 1.68 148 1.81 83 72.17 
Malta 14 0.20 15 0.18 9 64.28 
Netherlands 101 1.47 98 1.20 45 44.55 
Norway 88 1.29 34 0.42 17 19.31 
Poland 52 0.76 47 0.57 39 75.00 
Portugal 47 0.69 45 0.55 31 65.95 
Slovakia 21 0.31 20 0.24 14 66.67 
Slovenia 20 0.29 23 0.28 17 85.00 
Spain 166 2.42 120 1.47 71 42.77 
Sweden 139 2.03 35 0.43 14 9.35 
Switzerland 539 7.87 270 3.30 162 30.00 
United Kingdom 455 6.64 538 6.58 177 38.90 
USA 1343 19.61 567 6.94 204 15.19 
Total 6848 100.00 3380 41.34 1689 24.66 
 
Notes: Column (1) includes 6,848 firms from 29 countries in BVD's Bankscope. Column (3) shows the number of 
adopters of SWIFT from these 29 countries in SWIFT's database of customers (adoption information is from 
1977 to 2006). This is given as a % of all SWIFT's data (that includes non-banks). Column (5) reports the number 
matches between the Bankscope data of column (1) and SWIFT customers in column (3) - i.e. the number of 
adopters in Bankscope. Column 6 reports the proportion of Bankscope firms that (at some point) adopted SWIFT. 
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TABLE 2 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 Obs. Median Mean Standard deviation 
  
Variables     
Total assets (m$) 29970 729.43 10300 62000 
Total sales (m$) 29970 49.705 637.6793 3701.933 
Pretax profits (m$) 29970 5.936 104.894 759.944 
Employees 29970 164 1460.54 8479.635 
Operating expenses (m$) 29901 20.1 259.637 1674.894   
Ratios     
Profit margin (pre-tax 
profits/sales) 
29970 0.1384 0.1522 0.1524 
Return on assets 29970 0.61 0.7822 0.9919 
Return on equity 29946 7.43 8.5566 8.1563 
Cost to income 29789 67.13 68.337 29.8822   
 US&UK 
Total assets (m$) 8768 1371.213 17100 82800 
Total sales (m$) 8768 98.9 1190.498 5388.061 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 8768 18.842 253.4578 1268.289 
Profit margin 8768 0.2124 0.2067 0.1533   
 Rest of Europe 
Total assets (m$) 21100 557.761 7068.323 50000 
Total sales (m$) 21100 37.381 383.7651 2626.956 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 21100 3.541 39.709 361.452 
Profit margin 21100 0.112 0.1296 0.1464   
 Small Firms 
Total assets (m$) 14300 255.992 294.235 211.316 
Total sales (m$) 14300 17.273 22.053 27.465 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 14300 1.808 3.396 9.0938 
Profit margin 14300 0.1308 0.1418 0.156   
 Big Firms 
Total assets (m$) 15670 2429.1 19400 84700 
Total sales (m$) 15670 162.521 1199.482 5054.607 
Pre-tax profits (m$) 15670 22.23 197.518 1042.361 
Profit margin 15670 0.1459 0.1618 0.1483 
 
Notes: Sample includes 6,848 firms in 29 countries, from 1998 to 2005; m$ = Millions of US 
Dollars. "US & UK" are firms located in the United States of America and the United Kingdom, 
and "Rest of Europe" includes the European countries outside the UK (see Table 1). "Small" and 
"Big" firms are defined according to the overall median of the firm's assets.  
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TABLE 3 – SWIFT ADOPTION & FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Sample All firms  Small firms Big firms 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit     
log Assets
Employees



it
 – 0.0358
*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0358*** 
(0.0076) 
 0.0543*** 
(0.013) 
0.0268*** 
(0.0093) 
    
SWIFTit+1 – – 0.0155 
(0.0138) 
 – – 
SWIFTit 0.0011 
(0.0177) 
0.0006 
(0.0171) 
–0.0087 
(0.0162) 
 0.0012 
(0.0273) 
0.0023 
(0.0216) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0087 
(0.0205) 
–0.0106 
(0.0201) 
–0.0102 
(0.0201) 
 –0.0001 
(0.0309) 
–0.0187 
(0.0261) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0269* 
(0.016) 
0.0243 
(0.0159) 
0.0246 
(0.0158) 
 0.0376 
(0.0288) 
0.0114 
(0.0155) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0051 
(0.0133) 
–0.0057 
(0.0132) 
–0.0056 
(0.0132) 
 0.0059 
(0.023) 
–0.0162   
(0.014) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0263** 
(0.0113) 
0.026** 
(0.0112) 
0.0262** 
(0.0112) 
 0.0411** 
(0.0173) 
0.0105   
(0.0141) 
SWIFTit-5 0.038 
(0.0108) 
0.002 
(0.0108) 
0.002 
(0.0108) 
 –0.0002 
(0.0161) 
0.0028   
(0.0145) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0057 
(0.011) 
0.0055 
(0.011) 
0.0055 
(0.011) 
 0.0027 
(0.0172) 
0.0074   
(0.0141) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0105 
(0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0104) 
 0.0147 
(0.0171) 
0.0062    
(0.0132) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0034 
(0.0089) 
0.0026 
(0.0089) 
0.0026 
(0.0089) 
 –0.0015 
(0.016) 
0.0042   
(0.0105) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0184** 
(0.0077) 
0.0154** 
(0.0076) 
0.0155** 
(0.0076) 
 0.0167 
(0.0135) 
0.0138   
(0.009)     
Sum of coefficients 0.0823 0.07 0.0618  0.1181 0.0238 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0006 0.003 0.01  0.0024 0.4053 
Joint significance of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0018 0.0093 0.0096  0.0215 0.6004 
    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5615 5615 5615  2832 2783 
Number of obs. 29970 29970 29970  14300 15670 
R2 0.6694 0.6726 0.6727  0.6622 0.6852 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets are robust to 
heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of 
country and year dummies. The dependent variable in all columns (Π/Sit) is the Profit Margin denoting Pre-tax 
Profits over Total Revenues (Sales). In all columns we include a 9-year lag structure to test the long-term effect of 
SWIFT on firm performance. In column 3 we have also constructed a lead to investigate the causal direction of 
SWIFT adoption and firm performance. In columns 4 & 5, we split our data between “Small” and “Big” firms we 
use a mean of the Total Assets of each firm as size indicator to make the categorisation. The time period of our 
sample is 1998-2005 (eight years). 
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TABLE 4 – SWIFT ADOPTION AND SALES, EXPENSES AND LABOUR 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable log(Sales)it log(Opex)it log
Employees
Assets



it
 
 
log(Assets)it – 0.633*** 
(0.031) 
– 
 
SWIFTit 0.0386
(0.0646) 
0.0174 
(0.0473) 
–0.0162 
(0.0468) 
SWIFTit-1 0.1569** 
(0.0714) 
0.0219 
(0.0395) 
–0.0527 
(0.0385) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0813** 
(0.0373) 
–0.0217 
(0.0249) 
–0.0708** 
(0.0278) 
SWIFTit-3 0.0449 
(0.0308) 
–0.0473 
(0.0303) 
–0.0165 
(0.0312) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0605** 
(0.0247) 
–0.0146 
(0.0249) 
–0.0067 
(0.0239) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0064 
(0.0247) 
–0.0217 
(0.024) 
–0.0504* 
(0.0293) 
SWIFTit-6 –0.0078 
(0.0271) 
–0.0131 
(0.0258) 
–0.0043 
(0.0298) 
SWIFTit-7 –0.0095 
(0.0239) 
–0.0385*
(0.0221) 
–0.0196 
(0.0239) 
SWIFTit-8 0.003 
(0.0252) 
–0.0102 
(0.0202) 
–0.0232 
(0.0236) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0327 
(0.0338) 
–0.0662***
(0.025) 
–0.0846*** 
(0.0275) 
 
Sum of coefficients 0.4072 –0.1939 –0.345 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 
Joint significance of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0022 0.0036 0.0007 
 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 6727 6720 5620 
Number of obs. 39395 39259 30039 
R2 0.9722 0.9822 0.9429 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Standard errors 
in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and 
are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies. 
The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of total revenues, in column 2 the log 
of operating expenses, and in column 3 the log of employees over assets. The time 
period is 1998-2005. 
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TABLE 5 – SWIFT ADOPTION & FIRM PERFORMANCE – USA/UK & EU FIRMS 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Estimation method OLS OLS  OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Countries All firms  Small firms  Big firms 
Sample US&UK Rest of Europe  US&UK 
Rest of 
Europe  US&UK 
Rest of 
Europe 
Dependent 
variable 
Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit 
    
log Assets
Employees



it
 0.0595
***   
(0.0103) 
0.0327***
(0.0105) 
 0.0757** 
(0.0365) 
0.0566*** 
(0.0145) 
 0.0551*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0153 
(0.0134) 
    
SWIFTit –0.0322   
(0.0304) 
0.0121 
(0.0203) 
 –0.0457   
(0.0515) 
0.0154   
(0.0313) 
 –0.0211   
(0.0354) 
0.0132 
(0.0267) 
SWIFTit-1 0.0279    
(0.0387) 
–0.0247 
(0.0234) 
 0.0434   
(0.0788) 
–0.0119   
(0.0322) 
 0.0157   
(0.0411) 
–0.035 
(0.0329) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0316   
(0.0261) 
0.021 
(0.0194) 
 0.0628   
(0.0696) 
0.0346   
(0.0315) 
 0.0209   
(0.0264) 
–0.0014 
(0.0183) 
SWIFTit-3 0.0005   
(0.0185) 
–0.0086 
(0.0171) 
 0.0111   
(0.0519) 
0.0047   
(0.0254) 
 –0.0021   
(0.0178) 
–0.0297 
(0.0201) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0282**   
(0.0135) 
0.0253* 
(0.0148) 
 0.0651*   
(0.0356) 
0.0355*   
(0.0193) 
 0.0149   
(0.0131) 
0.0088 
(0.0225) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0008 
 (0.0115) 
0.002 
(0.0145) 
 –0.0337   
(0.027) 
0.0051   
(0.0186) 
 0.0112   
(0.0126) 
–0.005 
(0.0222) 
SWIFTit-6 –0.0081   
(0.0148) 
0.0113 
(0.0142) 
 –0.0368   
(0.0304) 
0.0124   
(0.0197) 
 0.033   
(0.0163) 
0.0112 
(0.0205) 
SWIFTit-7 –0.0131   
(0.0179) 
0.0191 
(0.0126) 
 0.0231   
(0.0262) 
0.0137   
(0.0204) 
 –0.0282   
(0.0227) 
0.024 
(0.0162) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0288** 
(0.0136) 
–0.0052 
(0.011) 
 0.0586**   
(0.0252) 
–0.0167   
(0.0185) 
 0.0181   
(0.0163) 
0.003 
(0.0132) 
SWIFTit-9 –0.0165   
(0.0155) 
0.024***
(0.0085) 
 –0.0275   
(0.0284) 
0.0261*   
(0.015) 
 0.0009   
(0.0184) 
0.0238** 
(0.01) 
    
Sum of 
coefficients 
0.0578 0.0764  0.1204 0.1189  0.0335 0.0127 
Significance of the 
sum of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.089 0.0117  0.1023 0.0076  0.3820 0.7412 
Joint significance 
of SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.1519 0.0079  0.2176 0.0543  0.5738 0.1444 
    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of firms 1405 4193  476 2356  929 1837 
Number of obs. 8768 21100  2768 11532  6000 9568 
R2 0.6572 0.6643  0.6454 0.6672  0.6604 0.6664 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we investigate the SWIFT-effects 
in two separate Country sub-samples: US&UK with all the rest of the European countries. Standard errors in 
brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. All 
equations include a full set of country and year dummies. In all columns we include a 9-year lag structure to test 
the long-run effect of SWIFT on firm performance. In columns 3 and 4, we report the coefficients for all the 
“Small” firms in the US&UK and the Rest of Europe, and in columns 5 and 6 for all the “Large”. As in all our 
“Small” and “Big” splits, we use the same median of the average Total Assets of each firm as size indicator to 
make the categorisation. The time period of our sample is again from 1998 to 2005 (eight years). 
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TABLE 6 – SWIFT NETWORK EFFECTS 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 
1%. Standard errors in brackets are robust and are clustered by 
firm. All equations include a full set of country and year 
dummies. The time period is 1998-2005. The Network Effect 
variable is the cumulative number of SWIFT adopters in 
country j since 1977 (and year t).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Estimation method OLS OLS 
Sample All firms 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit 
log Assets
Employees



it
 0.0362
*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0076) 
Network Effectjt/1000 0.1808*** 
(0.0575) 
– 
Network Effectjt-1/1000 – 0.2741*** 
(0.0547) 
SWIFTit 0.001 
(0.017) 
0.0013 
(0.017) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0102 
(0.02) 
–0.0107 
(0.02) 
SWIFTit-2 0.025 
(0.0158) 
0.025 
(0.0158) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0053 
(0.0132) 
–0.0054 
(0.0132) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0264** 
(0.0112) 
0.0264** 
(0.0112) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0023 
(0.0108) 
0.0023 
(0.0109) 
SWIFTit-6 0.006 
(0.011) 
0.0061 
(0.011) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0106 
(0.0103) 
0.0108 
(0.0104) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0033 
(0.0089) 
0.0034 
(0.0089) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0176** 
(0.0076) 
0.0183** 
(0.0076) 
Sum of coefficients 0.0765 0.0776 
Significance of the sum of 
SWIFT coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0011 
 
0.0009 
Joint significance of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0027 0.0020 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5615 5615 
Number of obs. 29970 29970 
R2 0.6730 0.6735 
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FIGURE 3 – LONG-TERM RETURNS FROM SWIFT  FIGURE 4 – LONG-TERM RETURNS FROM SWIFT  FIGURE 5 – LONG-TERM RETURNS FROM SWIFT 
 
Notes: Figure 3 is a graphical representation of column (1) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on 
Profit Margin in the whole sample. Our full sample includes 
6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption 
data run from 1977 - 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.  
Notes: Figure 4 is a graphical representation of column (2) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on 
Profit Margin in the whole sample. Our full sample includes 
6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption 
data run from 1977 - 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.  
Notes: Figure 5 is a graphical representation of column (3) in 
Table 3. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on 
Profit Margin in the whole sample. Our full sample includes 
6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption 
data run from 1977 - 2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005.  
 
       FIGURE 6 – LONG-TERM RETURNS IN SMALL FIRMS             FIGURE 7 – LONG-TERM RETURNS IN BIG FIRMS 
    
Notes: Figure 6 is a graphical representation of column (4) in Table 3. It presents the long run 
effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the sub-sample of Small firms. Our full sample 
includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 1977 - 
2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005. 
Notes: Figure 7 is a graphical representation of column (5) in Table 3. It presents the long run 
effect of SWIFT adoption on Profit Margin in the sub-sample of Big firms. Our full sample 
includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Adoption data run from 1977 - 
2006 and financial data from 1998 – 2005. 
  
 
FIGURE 8 – SWIFT EFFECT ON TOTAL SALES          FIGURE 9 – SWIFT EFFECT ON OPERATING EXPENSES   FIGURE 10 – SWIFT EFFECT ON LABOUR/ASSETS 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 8 is a graphical representation of column (1) in 
Table 4. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on 
the Total Revenues (Sales) of the firms of the whole sample. 
Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 countries (adopters 
& non-adopters). Descriptive Statistics of our variables are 
reported in Table 2. Adoption information is from 1977 to 
2006, and financial performance data are from 1998 to 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 9 is a graphical representation of column (2) in 
Table 4. It presents the long run effect of SWIFT adoption on 
the Operating Expenses of the firms in the whole sample. Again 
we can observe the dynamic effect of SWIFT. According to our 
analyses on SWIFT, expenses are expected to increase the first 
two years of the technology implementation. After that, 
operating expenses experience a drop since automates a list of 
processes in the organisations. Our full sample includes 6848 
firms in 29 countries (adopters & non-adopters). Descriptive 
Statistics of our variables are reported in Table 2. Adoption 
information is from 1977 to 2006, and financial performance 
data are from 1998 to 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 10 is a graphical representation of column (3) in Table 4. 
Here we observe a fall in the numbers of employees relatively to the 
assets of the firm sample. Our full sample includes 6848 firms in 29 
countries (adopters & non-adopters). Descriptive Statistics of our 
variables are reported in Table 2. Adoption information is from 1977 to 
2006, and financial performance data are from 1998 to 2005. 
FIGURE 11 – US&UK FIRMS                       FIGURE 12 – EUROPEAN FIRMS  
            
Notes: Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the results from US&UK and European (EU) firms from columns (1) and (2) respectively in Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the two 
sub-samples are reported in Table 2. The country statistics are reported in Table 1. Adoption information is from 1977 to 2006, and financial performance data are from 1998 
to 2005. Returns to SWIFT are defined by the Profit Margin ratio as described in the Table 2. 
 
         FIGURE 13 – US&UK SMALL FIRMS        FIGURE 14 – EUROPEAN SMALL FIRMS 
     
Notes: Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the results for US&UK and European (EU) Small firms from columns (3) and (4) respectively in Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the two 
country sub-samples are reported in Table 2. The country statistics are reported in Table 1. Additional statistics on the Small country sub-samples are reported in Table A2 of 
the Appendix. Small and Big firms are split according to the overall median of the sample. Adoption information is from 1977 to 2006, and financial performance data are 
from 1998 to 2005. Returns to SWIFT are defined by the Profit Margin ratio as described in the Table 2. 
APPENDIX TABLES - NOTE THAT THESE ARE NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION UNLESS REQUESTED BY 
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TABLE A1 – USING TOTAL ASSETS INSTEAD OF ASSETS/EMPLOYEES 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Estimation method OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Sample All firms  SWIFT adopters 
Dependent variable Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit    
log Assets
Employees



it
 0.0404
***   
(0.0084) 
–  0.0509*** 
(0.0098) 
– 
log(Assets)it – 0.0119*
(0.0066) 
 – 0.0133 
  (0.0098)    
SWIFTit 0.0014   
 (0.0168) 
–0.0023 
(0.0153) 
 –0.0012 
   (0.017) 
–0.0052 
(0.0155) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0015    
(0.0191) 
–0.0054 
(0.0178) 
 –0.0106  
 (0.02) 
–0.0052 
(0.0177) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0172  
  (0.0157) 
0.0133 
(0.0141) 
 0.0227 
   (0.0158) 
0.0120 
   (0.0141) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0073 
   (0.0125) 
0.0072 
(0.0121) 
 –0.0069   
(0.0133) 
0.0055   
(0.0122) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0206*
   (0.0112) 
0.0184* 
(0.0104) 
 0.025**  
  (0.0112) 
0.0170   
(0.0105) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0015 
 (0.0100) 
0.001 
(0.0106) 
 0.0015 
   (0.0109) 
0.0009   
(0.0106) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0032    
(0.0095) 
0.0028 
(0.0103) 
 0.0056 
   (0.011) 
0.0021   
(0.0104) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0027   
 (0.0098) 
0.0096 
(0.0096) 
 0.0086 
   (0.0104) 
0.0081   
(0.0097) 
SWIFTit-8 0.0009 
(0.009) 
0.0098 
(0.0093) 
 0.0028 
  (0.0091) 
0.0093   
(0.0093) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0167**  
  (0.0077) 
0.013 
(0.0083) 
 0.0128 
   (0.0079) 
0.0107   
(0.0086)    
Sum of coefficients 0.0555 0.0672  0.0604 0.0554 
Significance of the sum of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0155 0.0020  0.0274 0.0296 
Joint significance of SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.2009 0.0299  0.1387 0.3271 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of firms 5615 6727  1371 1642 
Number of obs. 29970 39393  7320 9357 
R2 0.6919 0.6778  0.6337 0.6271 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we perform some robustness check on the 
relationship between SWIFT adoption and firm performance. Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. All equations include a full set of country and year dummies and in 
column (1) their interaction (the same column without the interactions can be found in Table 3, column (2)). In all columns we 
include a 9-year lag structure to test the long-run effect of SWIFT on firm performance. We test our data using the whole sample (col. 
1 and 2), and SWIFT adopters sample (col. 3 and 4). 
 
  
 
TABLE A2 – TYPES OF BANK IN THE SAMPLE 
 
Bank Specialisations Number of Firms 
SWIFT 
Adopters 
(firms) 
SWIFT Non-
adopters 
(firms)   
Bank Holding & Holding Companiesa 717 38 679 
Central Banks 28 27 1 
Commercial Banksa 1927 1034 893 
Cooperative Banksa 1620 87 1533 
Investment Banks /Securities Housesa 498 226 272 
Islamic Banks 1 1 0 
Medium & Long Term Credit Banks 48 18 30 
Multi-lateral Governmental Banks 2 1 1 
Non-banking Credit Institutions 463 52 411 
Real Estate /Mortgage Banks 189 31 158 
Savings Banks 1280 138 1142 
Specialised Governmental Credit Institutions 75 36 39   
 6848 1689 5159 
 
Notes: Sample includes 6848 firms (205,440 observations) in 29 countries, from 1977 to 2006. 
aThese banks are included in the sample for columns (5) and (6) in Table A3. 
 
  
 
TABLE A3 –HETEROGENEITY OF THE SWIFT EFFECT ACROSS TYPES OF BANK 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Estimation method OLS OLS  OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Sample Commercial Banks  Non-Commercial 
Banks 
 Selection of Banks 
Dependent 
variable Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit  Π/Sit Π/Sit 
    
log Assets
Employees



it
 0.0395
*** 
(0.013) 
–  0.0319*** 
(0.0088) 
–  0.0391*** 
(0.009) 
– 
log(Assets)it – 0.0137 
(0.01) 
 – 0.0098  
(0.0089) 
 – 0.016** 
(0.0076)     
SWIFTit 0.0005   
(0.0261) 
–0.0076   
(0.0235) 
 –0.001   
(0.0207) 
–0.0004 
(0.0179) 
 –0.0086   
(0.0209) 
–0.0103   
(0.0184) 
SWIFTit-1 –0.0052   
(0.0255) 
–0.0041   
(0.0234) 
 –0.0194  
(0.0332) 
–0.0085 
(0.0277) 
 –0.0205   
(0.0241) 
–0.0166   
(0.0209) 
SWIFTit-2 0.0209   
(0.0175) 
0.0116   
(0.0166) 
 0.0273   
(0.0308) 
0.0108   
(0.0255) 
 0.0287   
(0.0181) 
0.0163   
(0.016) 
SWIFTit-3 –0.0043   
(0.0165) 
0.012   
(0.0158) 
 –0.0141   
(0.0208) 
–0.0089   
(0.0172) 
 –0.0096   
(0.0146) 
0.0072   
(0.0136) 
SWIFTit-4 0.0319**   
(0.0137) 
0.0235**   
(0.0128) 
 0.0055  
(0.0181) 
0.0005   
(0.018) 
 0.0327***   
(0.0117) 
0.0241**   
(0.0112) 
SWIFTit-5 0.0000   
(0.0137) 
–0.0018   
(0.0134) 
 0.0018   
(0.0156) 
0.0017   
(0.0169) 
 –0.0013   
(0.0117) 
–0.0005   
(0.0114) 
SWIFTit-6 0.0116 
(0.0127) 
0.0112 
(0.0131) 
 –0.014   
(0.0211) 
–0.0193   
(0.0164) 
 0.0063 
(0.0111) 
0.0057 
(0.0108) 
SWIFTit-7 0.0191 
(0.0117) 
0.0122 
(0.0113) 
 –0.0171   
(0.0213) 
–0.0037   
(0.0181) 
 0.0087 
(0.0105) 
0.0053 
(0.0099) 
SWIFTit-8 –0.0014 
(0.0107) 
0.005 
(0.0109) 
 0.0044  
(0.0161) 
0.0125   
(0.0176) 
 –0.0004 
(0.0094) 
0.006 
(0.0093) 
SWIFTit-9 0.0171* 
(0.0092) 
0.0175* 
(0.0098) 
 0.0041   
(0.0139) 
–0.0059   
(0.0155) 
 0.0153* 
(0.0082) 
0.0195** 
(0.0086)     
Sum of 
coefficients 
0.0902 0.0796  –0.0225 –0.0211  0.0513 0.0567 
Significance of the 
sum of SWIFT 
coef. (Prob>F) 
0.0045 0.0085  0.5608 0.5222  0.0507 0.0193 
Joint significance 
of SWIFT coef. 
(Prob>F) 
0.0059 0.0460  0.9422 0.9811  0.0110 0.0170 
    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of firms 1565 1910  4050 4817  3903 4659 
Number of obs. 8516 10840  21454 28553  21272 27516 
R2 0.6552 0.6452  0.6829 0.6165  0.6625 0.6575 
 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. In this table we perform some 
robustness check on the relationship between SWIFT adoption and firm performance. Standard errors in 
brackets are robust to heteroskedacity and autocorrelation of unknown form and are clustered by firm. 
All equations include a full set of country and year dummies. In all columns we include a 9-year lag 
structure to test the long-run effect of SWIFT on firm performance. We test our data using Commercial 
Banks sample (columns (1) and (2)), Non-Commercial Banks and other financial institutions sample 
(columns (3) and (4)). The final sample columns include only commercial, holding, cooperative and 
investment banks (see Table A2). 
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